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Directing attention to a warning statement 
 
Introduction 
 
In accordance with the Property Agents and Motor Dealers Act 2000 (Qld) 
(‘PAMDA’), the buyer and seller under a relevant contract are bound by the 
relevant contract when the buyer or the buyer’s agent receives the warning 
statement, the information sheet (where a unit sale is involved) and the relevant 
contract in the manner prescribed by the statute. 
 
One of the prescriptive requirements imposed by PAMDA is the requirements for 
the seller or the seller’s agent to direct the attention of the buyer or the buyer’s 
agent to the warning statement, the information sheet (where a unit sale is 
involved) and the relevant contract. 
 
PAMDA provides statutory examples of how the attention of the buyer or the 
buyer’s agent may be directed: 
 by oral advice 
 by including a paragraph in an accompanying letter 
 
The issue of whether the statutory requirement of ‘directing the attention of the 
buyer’ to these documents had been satisfied arose for consideration by de 
Jersey CJ in Collis v Currumbin Investments Pty Ltd [2009] QSC 297. 
 
Facts 
 
On or about 14 January 2008, the solicitors for the buyer received, from the 
solicitors for the seller, a letter enclosing a relevant contract for a unit sale which 
had then been signed by the seller (the buyer having already signed in 
accordance with usual practice).  The letter said: 
 
 ‘We now enclose the following documents: 
1. Important notice to buyer; 
2. PAMDA form 27c 
3. Disclosure Statement; and 
4. PAMDA form 30c and contract.’ 
 
The buyer submitted that the cooling-off period had not commenced, as the seller 
had not directed the attention of the buyer or the buyer’s solicitor to the warning 
statement as required by PAMDA.  As part of this submission, it was alleged that 
the letter in no way drew the buyer’s attention to the warning statement.  In 
making this submission, the buyer referred to the decision of Fryberg J in Hedley 
Commercial Property Service Pty Ltd v BRCP Oasis Land Pty Ltd [2008] QSC 
261 especially [84] – [88]. 
 
Decision 
 
In rejecting the buyer’s submission on this point, de Jersey CJ opined as follows: 
 I consider that the respondent did direct the attention of the solicitors for Mr Collis to the 
warning statement, by referring to it expressly in that short one page letter of 14 January 
2008, and as the first of the four numbered documents enclosed with the letter, 
describing it as an “Important Notice to Buyer”.  It was not necessary, in order to secure 
compliance with the statutory requirement, that the words “direct attention” as such must 
have been used.  It was sufficient if, by referring specifically to the document, as one of 
importance, and prominently in an otherwise brief communication, the respondent in fact 
drew attention to the document.  It did so.  The position would have been different had 
the notice not been referred to expressly in the letter, and simply included in the same 
envelope when delivered.1 
de Jersey CJ also opined in relation to an alternative argument advanced on 
behalf of the seller, on the assumption (contrary to His Honour’s view) that there 
was no compliance with the PAMDA requirement to direct the buyer’s attention to 
the warning statement.  The alternative argument was that the buyer had waived 
the statutory right to have his attention directed to the warning statement.  The 
waiver relied on was in the sense of estoppel, rather than election, as it was 
alleged that the buyer made a clear representation that the buyer was 
proceeding with a subsisting contract, and this representation was relied upon 
when the seller subsequently engaged a builder to build a house on the subject 
land.  If this evidence led for the seller was accepted, de Jersey CJ considered 
that would arguably establish the elements necessary to found an equitable 
estoppel or waiver as referred to in Walton Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 
164 CLR 387. 
 
In the result, de Jersey CJ found that the buyer’s purported termination of the 
contract was of no effect, on two alternate bases: 
 
1. As the only applicable cooling-off period commenced on or about 14 
January 2008, as the letter of that date met the requirements of PAMDA, 
and the contract had not been terminated within the cooling-off period, the 
contract subsisted. 
2. If, contrary to this view, the seller had not complied with the requirements 
of PAMDA, the buyer had waived his statutory right to have the warning 
statement drawn to his attention or to terminate based on that requirement 
not being complied with. 
 
Accordingly, the buyer’s application seeking a declaration that the contract had 
been lawfully terminated was dismissed. 
                                                 
1 Collis v Currumbin Investments Pty Ltd [2009] QSC 297, [7]. 
 
Comment 
 
This decision is yet another example of the minefield that PAMDA represents for 
those involved in conveyancing in Queensland.  Notwithstanding that the 
statutory requirement was satisfied in this instance, what may constitute 
‘directing the attention of the buyer or the buyer’s agent’ in any given context is 
by no means clear.  It may be better for all concerned if the requirement was the 
subject of a statutory mandate rather than merely being the subject of statutory 
examples.  This is one of many areas where PAMDA is in urgent need of reform. 
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